The basic self-awareness of humanity, that 'I live in the world and with the world', presupposes the existence, the real existence as reality, of both myself, humanity as such, and that which is outside myself, which exists apart from me or, more exactly, independently of human awareness ... In the act of cognisance it is impossible to separate subject from object; cognisance is at once the one and the other; more exactly, it is precisely the cognisance of the object by the subject, a unity, that is, in which the one can be distinguished from the other only in the abstract, yet at the same time the object is not obliterated by the subject, neither is the latter dissolved in the object of cognisance exterior to itself. Moreover, once unified, they do not engulf one another even though, while maintaining their mutual independence, they are no longer divided. The theological formula without confusion and without separation is fully applicable to the cognitive interrelationship of subject and object...In other words, subjective and objective are analogous to the two natures of Christ--both bound up together as one, yet fully distinct. It is a paradox on which the pursuit of all knowledge depends.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
Florensky on Ontology
From Avril Pyman's biography on Florensky, quoting Florensky:
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Right. This is moderate realism...directly opposed to conceptualism, which you seem to have defended at other places. The knower (subject) becomes the thing known by abstracting a concept from the particular (object). Thus "the one can be distinguished from the other only in the abstract, yet at the same time the object is not obliterated by the subject, neither is the latter dissolved in the object of cognisance exterior to itself."
ReplyDeleteAnd of course, the two natures of Christ coexisting without confusion and without separation quite clearly images the unity of the tripersonal Godhead and each person's knowledge of the others, to take it one step further into theology proper. Hence our participation in the divine perichoresis insofar as we are in Christ, and hence also the Trinitarian ground of our epistemology.
ReplyDeleteAll theology is theology proper, as has been said; but so is all knowledge.
Responding to Josh here. My understanding is that conceptualism is a statement concerning the existence of universals. I consider this different from ontology. I believe in the existence of the universal, but not in universals. It seems to me universals are essentially linguistic constructions, hence subject to evolution. Even the idea of "reality" seems to be merely on the subjective side of things. There remains an objective side--the divine nature, to carry the analogy forward--that remains totally inexplicable in human terms.
ReplyDeleteI'm having trouble with the numerous contradictions in that paragraph...
ReplyDelete1. Conceptualism is a statement concerning the existence of universals, which therefore is an ontological statement. Perhaps we are operating on different meanings of ontology?
ReplyDelete2. Do you mean that you believe in one universal only? A monist view?
3. If universals are subject to physical change, then they aren't universals, but particulars. Saying universals are only linguistic constructions is a key component of nominalism, which denies the ontology of universals.
I'll leave the question of reality being a mind-model to other topics.
If my thought is full of contradictions, I suspect I'm on the right track.
ReplyDelete1. Perhaps Florensky is talking about the ontology of universals, but I missed that. I'm interested here in the ontology of reality itself. It seems to me you can talk about the existence of "stuff" without talking about the existence of properties stuff holds.
2. Is "dynamic monism" an option? Again, this sounds like a contradiction, but then again, so does Trinity.
3. I do wish we could think in more modern categories. To me it doesn't make sense to spin our wheels arguing between nominalism and realism. I'm more intrigued by how the brain actually forms "universals" in an evolutionary way. I guess that means I'm dismissing a realist answer to the problem of universals, but I honestly don't see what's wrong with that.
1) Ah but "matter is the principle of individuation," and real existence is always combined with real essence...so, in one sense, you can discuss Being, or "stuff" without discussing the essence, but when you start discussing something actual, you must take into account properties.
ReplyDeleteIndeed, I think the Florensky quote is more concerned with the epistemology of universals in reality, but of course, determining whether said universals actually exist in things is prior to that discussion.
2)The concept of the Trinity is a contradiction? This must be an ecumenical divide between us...it's unimaginable, but I don't see it as a contradiction. One can analogize it, as C.S. Lewis did, to people who could only see in two dimensions trying to imagine a cube. (I realize you said "sounds like," but even this I'm not sure I agree with)
3) "I'm more intrigued by how the brain actually forms "universals" in an evolutionary way." By making this statement, you've assumed that a) the brain forms universals and therefore b) the ontology of universals is purely in matter. But what I'm saying is that this assumption is excluded by definition. What is wrong with that is simply what's wrong with nominalism, that in its most extreme form, it is self-contradictory. One cannot adequately explain how we discern the one from the many or vice versa unless there are real essences in things to abstract. Thus enters the Florensky quote...
I think you're making too many assumptions based on a very classical ontological perspective. Your statement says it all: "One cannot adequately explain how we discern the one from the many or vice versa unless there are real essences in things to abstract." That is merely assuming a realist answer to the problem of universals, and the truth of the matter is that I don't even see the importance of the problem, much less your solution to it.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure whether you or I is closer to Florensky. It's worth pointing out that he opposed both Protestant "positivism" and Roman Catholic scholasticism. So probably we're both wrong according to him.
He may oppose Scholaticism, but not on this point at least...
ReplyDeleteIf you're ever interested in the importance of this seemingly obscure, perennial philosophy topic, you could try Richard Weaver's Ideas Have Consequences for a discussion of how the explicit adoption of nominalist-influenced philosophies helped to bring about 20th century atrocities...
Consider this: if the problem is not important, then why post about epistemology at all? Because every thing about words and meaning, about symbols and abstraction, about transcendental axioms, is going to pre-suppose an answer to the question of what exists in reality and how do we know it, which is really what the problem of universals is all about.
ReplyDelete